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MOTIVATION
• About 85% of the world’s children live in the developing world, and these children
require quality education in order to thrive later on in life.
• Lagos State is the most economically important state of Nigeria. Asides its economic
importance, Lagos is also the most populated city in West Africa
• The state has 339 Public Junior Secondary Schools and 319 Senior Secondary Schools
(LASG 2016)
• Enrolment rates are low (about 40%), the percentage of overage students at various
levels is high (at least 30% at any given level) (UBEC 2010)
• The ILO(2003) lamented that the situation of teachers in the school system in the
Sub-Saharan region is so bad that it had reached “an intolerable low point”
• How can we motivate/encourage these teachers to do better?
This Paper
In this paper I answer the question: how do incentives affect the productivity or effort
of public school teachers in Lagos, Nigeria?
• We randomly selected 10 public schools into treatment and control schools – 6
treatment, 4 control.
• The incentives were awarded to the teachers in each school with the highest average
improvement in teacher effort.
• There were 3 treatment arms: monetary incentives (a prize of about NGN5000 or
$15 cash), near monetary incentives (a supermarket gift card equal in value to the cash
prize) and non monetary incentives (an award ceremony at a school wide assembly)
• The outcome of teacher effort was measured using a teacher effectiveness survey –
previous studies have used test scores as the outcome of choice – administered at
baseline and end line to measure the following characteristics:
1. Presentation of Content
2. Clarity of Expectations or Directions
3. Helpfulness/Availability
4. Usefulness/Clarity of Feedback on Performance
5. Encouragement of Participation/Discussion
6. Motivation
7. Overall Teaching Effectiveness
8. Final Evaluation Score
Contribution
I find that:
Monetary incentives and near monetary incentives have no significant impact on
teacher effort as measured by our key performance indicators. Non monetary incentives
surprisingly have significant negative impacts on usefulness of feedback, encouraging
participation and motivation. Further, non monetary incentives have significant negative
impacts on the most important indicator – the final evaluation score.
I am able to show that incentives do not always yield expected impacts, even when we
use alternative measurement tools such as the teaching effectiveness survey to measure
changes in productivity.
Implications:
It is most likely that the issues that cause poor performance amongst government
teachers in developing countries runs much deeper than incentives; institutions and
attitudes must also be reformed in order to experience significant changes in behavior.
Aggressive monitoring mechanisms could also be used to complement incentives
schemes (as in the Duflo(2010) paper) in order to increase the impact of these
programs.
METHODS
• This research made use of primary data collected from 10 Public Secondary Schools in Lagos State in the final quarter of the
2016/2017 school year. Surveyors made use of a Teacher effectiveness survey with 43 questions (all scaled from 1 to 6 with 1
being the lowest value and 6 the highest) which allowed students to evaluate their teachers’ “effort” under 7 broad categories
• Simple additive indices are created to compound the questions in the survey into each of these broad headers so as to avoid
having too many dependent variables by adding together the responses for relevant questions and multiplying by their mean. A
final overall index variable was also created which compounds all 43 questions in the survey into one score. This overall index will
be referred to as the ‘Final Score’.
• Lagos State has 6 educational districts in total. 2 districts were randomly selected from the pool (Eti-Osa and Lagos Mainland),
and our 6 treatment schools were then randomly selected from within one of these districts and 4 control schools for from the
other. This was done in order to prevent significant spillover effects even within the districts.
• The survey was administered at baseline and end line (a 4-week window) in the randomly selected treatment and control schools
to enable us isolate the impact of our incentive treatment on the outcomes of interest. 6 of the schools in our sample were
treatment schools that either received monetary, near-monetary or non-monetary rewards. The other 4 schools were used as our
counterfactual control schools. Our treatment variable is simply an indicator variable where 1 indicates treated schools and 0
indicates the control schools.
SPECIFICATION
Identifying assumption: Effort outcomes are exogenous conditional on the random assignment of  treatment
• Differences in Differences (DID) methodology
• In addition to the basic linear regression assumptions, major underlying assumption of  this method is the parallel trends 
assumption.
• The basic empirical model we will be estimating is: 
𝑇𝑒𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑟𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 ++𝛽1𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 + 𝜌𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 + 𝜇𝑖
•*** Standard errors are clustered at the school level
•Where 𝑇𝑒𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑟𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑡 is the effort of  teacher i at time t as measured by our key indicators,𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡 is an indicator variable 
which shows the treatment status of  teacher i at time t (1 if  you are in the treatment group and 0 otherwise), 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 is an indicator 
variable which is 1 at the end line and 0 at baseline and 𝛽1tells us the differential impact on teacher effort of  the assigned incentive 
relative to the control group.
RESULTS
Figure 1: Baseline (Left) & Endline(Right) Mean of  Final Score in 
Treatment (1) and Control (0) Groups.
TABLE 1: Overall Differences in Differences Estimates
(1)
Presentation 
of  Content
(2)
Clarity of  
Expectations
(3)
Helpfulness
(4)
Useful 
Feedback
(5)
Encouraging 
Participation
(6)
Motivation
(7)
Overall 
Teaching 
Effectivenes
s
(8) 
Final
Evaluation
Score
Time -0.107* -0.074 -0.113 -0.041 0.006 -0.029 -0.164 -0.058
(0.13) (0.11) (0.06) (0.06) (0.03) (0.04) (0.16) (0.06)
Treatment 0.256 0.175 0.261 0.307 0.312 0.280 0.292 0.275
(0.20) (0.10) (0.21) (0.21) (0.18) (0.17) (0.19) (0.17)
DID 0.101 -0.160 0.077 -0.005 -0.140 -0.086 -0.084 -0.045
(0.23) (0.21) (0.22) (0.21) (0.20) (0.20) (0.19) (0.20)
_cons 4.736*** 4.731*** 4.707*** 4.610*** 4.623*** 4.726*** 4.658*** 4.682***
(0.07) (0.04) (0.07) (0.06) (0.03) (0.04) (0.10) (0.05)
R-Squared 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03
Observatio
ns
3382 3382 3382 3382 3382 3382 3382 3382
TABLE 4: Non Monetary Differences in Differences Estimates
(1)
Presentation 
of  Content
(2)
Clarity of  
Expectations
(3)
Helpfulness
(4)
Useful 
Feedback
(5)
Encouraging 
Participation
(6)
Motivation
(7)
Overall 
Teaching 
Effectiveness
(8) 
Final
Evaluation
Score
Time -0.107 -0.073 -0.113 -0.041 0.006 -0.038 -0.164 -0.058
(0.14) (0.12) (0.06) (0.06) (0.03) (0.04) (0.16) (0.06)
NonMonTrea
t
0.565* 0.320** 0.582* 0.642* 0.572* 0.545* 0.495 0.549*
(0.21) (0.07) (0.20) (0.22) (0.21) (0.18) (0.29) (0.18)
DID -0.103 -0.386 -0.166 -
0.265**
-0.383*** -0.324** -0.219 -0.283*
(0.14) (0.27) (0.09) (0.06) (0.03) (0.07) (0.17) (0.08)
_cons 4.736*** 4.731*** 4.707*** 4.610**
*
4.623*** 4.726*** 4.658*** 4.682***
R-Squared
(0.07)
0.07
(0.04)
0.03
(0.07)
0.07
(0.06)
0.06
(0.03)
0.05
(0.05)
0.05
(0.11)
0.03
(0.05)
0.07
Observations 1889 1889 1889 1889 1889 1889 1889 1889
DISCUSSION AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
• Incentives do not always yield desired results. This is not a
surprising conclusion. Non monetary incentives have significant
negative effects.
• Lewis and Podgursky (2000) outline 7 major issues that could arise
as a result of merit based pay schemes for teachers, helping us to
understand why these schemes can yield contrary results.
• Calibration of incentives could have been done if not for financial
limitations, Demographic information could not be collected &
Time Constraint ( 4 weeks between baseline and endline)
• The teacher effectiveness survey should continue to be used in
order to determine impacts on less obvious outcomes than test
scores, which only show one aspect of the students learning.
• Issues underlying meager performance of government teachers in
developing countries runs much deeper than incentives; institutions
and attitudes must also be reformed in order to experience
significant changes in behavior.
• Policy makers in these countries must examine the incentives and
compensation structure for these teachers to determine if it is
effective and fair.
